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EMINENT DOMAIN IN COLORADO
GILBERT GOLDSTEIN AND ABE L. HOFFMAN
of the Denver Bar
"Whatever may have been the ancient right of condemnation,
it has been restrained by constitutional limitations in the protec-
tion of individual rights. The power lies dormant in the state
until the legislature speaks . . . . The right to condemn private
property is therefore a creature of statute, pursuant to which it
must clearly appear either by express grant or by necessary im-
plication." '
Thus spoke the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado in
its most recent utterance in the field of Eminent Domain.2 This
statement brings into sharp contrast the right of the state and
its subdivisions to appropriate private property and the right of
the individual to be unmolested in the enjoyment of his property
until there has been a declaration of public necessity and a grant
of power by the legislature. It is obvious, then, that unless the
statutes clearly state (1) the purposes for which property may
be condemned; (2) whose property may be condemned, and by
whom; and (3) the procedure such condemnation should follow,
unavoidable litigation will result and, in fact, is taking place
concerning preliminary matters rather than the basic question of
the compensation to be paid.
This article will concern itself with an analysis of the provi-
sion of our Constitution and statutes on eminent domain, their
strength and weakness, and attempt to come to some conclusion
as to possible changes or amendments.
We may start with a fundamental proposition often stated
by our courts:
Both our state constitution and statutes protect the
individual in his vested rights and prohibit the taking
thereof for public or private use without condemnation
under proper proceedings and just compensation given
therefor.3 . . .
The provisions of our Constitution referred to which protect
these individual rights are embodied in Article II, Sections 14
and 15:
Private property shall not be taken for private use
unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways
of necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or
ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural,
mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes.
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for
public or private use, without just compensation. Such
'Mack v. Town of Craig, 68 Colo. 337, 191 P. 101.
Potashnick v. Public Service Co., Colo. Bar Assn. Advance Sheet, July 19,
1952.
1 Stuart v. County Commissioners of Jefferson County, 25 Colo. App. 568,
575, 139 P. 577.
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compensation shall be ascertained by a board of commis-
sioners, of not less than three freeholders, or by a jury,
when required by the owner of the property, in such
manner as may be prescribed by law, and until the same
shall be paid to the owner, or into court for the owner,
the property shall not be needlessly disturbed, or the
proprietary rights of the owner therein divested; and
whenever an attempt is made to take private property
for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the
contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial ques-
tion, and determined as such without regard to any leg-
islative assertion that the use is public.
These sections merely confirm the common law limitation con-
cerning who may take private property and emphasizes the fact
that the use for which the property may be taken must be a public
use. Although in the exceptional cases listed in Section 14 there
is authority for taking of private property for private uses, the
right is narrowly confined. In Pine Martin Mining Co. v. Empire
Zinc Co.,' the Court stated:
Although the words "private use" occur in our con-
stitution and statutes, it is obvious that they do not mean
a strictly private use, that is to say, one having no rela-
tion to the public interest. The fact that the constitution
permits private property to be taken for certain specified
uses is an implied declaration that such uses are so closely
connected with the public interest as to be at least quasi-
public, or in a modified sense, affected with the public
interest ...
Section 15 declares that property may not be taken or dam-
aged without proper compensation. It also sets out the methods
of determining the compensation, and provides that until this
compensation has been paid into the court, the property shall not
be needlessly disturbed. It also makes provision for a full judicial
determination on whether the purpose for which property is
proposed to be taken is a public use.
Though apparently expressed as clearly as possible, this con-
stitutional provision has been involved in litigation in more than
50 cases reported by courts of review beginning with Denver v.
Bayer,5 and concluding with Potaschnick v. Public Service Co.6
Even before this article appears in print, additional opinions may
be handed down. Any word used in the constitutional provision
may be a source of controversy. For example, whole treatises could
be written on the meaning and implication of the words, or dam-
aged, or upon the word, public, but such investigations are beyond
the scope of this article.
The provision, however, does by limitation recognize the
powers of the sovereign to condemn private property for public
' 90 Colo. 529, 537, 11 P. 2d 221.
17 Colo. 13, 2 P. 6.
1 Colorado Bar Assn. Advance Sheet, July 19, 1952.
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use 7 and is the basis for every such taking in Colorado.
Despite the clear delimitations on the power of Eminent
Domain set forth in the provisions just discussed, Article XV,
Section 8 of the Constitution states:
The right of eminent domain shall never be abridged
nor so construed as to prevent the general assembly from
taking the property and franchises of incorporated com-
panies, and subjecting them to public use, the same as the
property of individuals; and the police power of the state
shall never be abridged or so construed as to permit cor-
porations to conduct their business in such manner as to
infringe the equal rights of individuals or the general
well-being of the state.
Apparently the intent of this section is to prohibit forever a
public body from alienating in any way its authority to condemn
public utility corporations or their property.
Although this section has been quoted once 8 and cited twice "
in Colorado decisions, it apparently has never been interpreted by
our Supreme Court. It would seem to codify the common law
doctrine that: "The power of eminent domain is inalienable and
no legislature can bind itself or its successors not to exercise this
power when public necessity and convenience require it;" 10 and
to make clear that corporate properties, including special fran-
chises, may be taken just as individual property.
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that under the Con-
stitution any property may be condemned for public use, but that,
unless the legislature by statute outlines the extent of the power
and who may exercise it and in what manner, this power will
remain dormant in the state.
We shall now consider what statutory provisions have been
enacted in Colorado and how well they answer the needs of the
agency which takes and the owner of the property taken.
The statutory law of eminent domain legislation is compiled
mainly in Chapter 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., under the heading,
Eminent Domain, and Article 5, Chapter 163, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann.
entitled Right of Eminent Domain under the Towns and Cities
chapter. This, unfortunately, does not mean that such legislation
is not found in many other places in the statutes. On the contrary,
it seems to be found everywhere. Authority to exercise the right
of eminent domain by various state, city, quasi-public, or quasi-
municipal corporations is found in Section 228, Chapter 41; Sec-
tion 76, Chapter 57; Section 69, Chapter 73; Sections 3, 8, 39
and 70, Chapter 82; Section 96, Chapter 134; Sections 388, 444
and 478, Chapter 90; Section 189, Chapter 46; Sections 142 and
143, Chapter 138; Section 111, Chapter 143; Section 13, Chapter
'Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 217, 220.
Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P. 493.
Denver Power Co. v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 30 Colo. 204, 69 P. 568; Fort
Collins v. Public Serv. Co., 69 Colo. 554, 135 P. 1332.
10 8 Am. Jur. 636, Sec. 7.
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138; all in 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann. and other places.
Apparently little or no study was made as to existing legis-
lation when new statutes granting the right were passed. Con-
flicts thus may occur, as the following illustration will suggest:
Section 142, Chapter 138, states:
The district, when necessary for the purposes of this
article, shall have a dominant right of eminent domain
over the right of eminent domain of railroad, telegraph,
telephone, gas, water power and other companies and cor-
porations, and over towns, cities and counties and other
public corporations.
Section 70, Chapter 82, states:
The purpose of condemnation for the rehabilitation
of an area hereunder is hereby declared to be for a
superior public use and property already devoted to one
public use may be condemned for the purposes of this
article. (S. L. '45, p. 622, Sec. 9, effective April 9, 1945.)
What happens when a rehabilitation area meets a conservancy
district? Is this the irresistible force meeting the immovable ob-
j ect?
So, too, throughout our statutes, we have the same question,
for the most part unanswered. How far does an agency whose
use of land is public in nature have the authority to condemn the
land of another public body already dedicated to one public use
for another irreconcilable public use? The answer should be in
the statutes, but, unfortunately, is not.
Article 5, Chapter 163, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., Towns and
Cities, is a special purpose statute granting powers to cities of
the first or second class for a restricted number of public uses,
such as roads, parks or public improvements. Although it differs
in many instances from the General Eminent Domain Act, there
is a major point of possible distinction which should be discussed.
Under the general act, if no portion of a person's property
is taken, he can receive no compensation for diminution in value
of his property by reason of the proposed project, but a neighbor
whose property is severed, may recover for the identical impair-
ment to remainder which is denied in the first instance.
On the other hand, under the .provisions of the Towns and
Cities Act, Section 125, Chapter 163, damages are defined as fol-
lows:
The fair and actual cash market value of all prop-
erty proposed to be taken for the improvement without
reference to the projected improvement, and
The fair, direct, and actual damages caused on ac-
count of said improvement to other property not taken
for the improvement.
and benefits are determined as follows:
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' . . by assessing against the owner or owners of
all real estate which will be specially benefited by the
proposed improvement the amounts of said benefit as
special assessments.
It appears to the authors that the damages allowed and bene-
fits assessed under the Towns and Cities Act are quite different
from those referred to in the general statute, in that they con-
template all damages and all benefits to any property, whether or
not there is a partial taking. The question of whether the general
act is in accord with the Constitution does not appear to have
been passed upon. It is of some advantage to the condemning
agency to use the general act rather than the Towns and Cities
Act. Under the latter, the extent of damage and benefit can be
appraised only with difficulty, since it applies to property un-
touched but indirectly affected by a new improvement, be it park
or parking lot. But, if the condemnation is invoked under the
general act, the owner would not be chargeable for the benefits
received nor compensable for detriment suffered where no part
of his property is actually taken. Some revision of these incon-
sistent acts seems to be in order.
Although, as indicated, the provisions of Chapter 61 and
Chapter 163 vary in many respects, our Supreme Court has failed
in many instances to recognize this distinction. For instance, one
of the mileposts in our interpretation of the General Eminent
Domain Statute has been Lavelle v. Julesburg, 49 Colo. 290, de-
cided in 1910. Yet, the case is cited as authority for Wassenich v.
Denver, 67 Colo. 456, which came up under an amendment of
1911 to the Towns and Cities Act. The provisions of the two stat-
utes on the point involved, far from being identical, appear to be
contradictory. To illustrate further, Wassenich v. Denver supra,
is cited as authority in numerous cases arising under the general
act, although it purports to construe the widely different Towns
and Cities Act.
To comment briefly upon the General Eminent Domain Act,
we find first of all that it is not really one act with one procedure,
but is a compilation of at least four separate acts conferring power
in some cases on the same and in other cases on different condemn-
ing agencies through procedures that vary in substance as well
as in detail.
Sections 1-20 of Chapter 61 comprise the basis of the Eminent
Domain procedure in Colorado, being the procedure under which
perhaps more than 90 per cent of all condemnation actions have
been and are being brought. Historically, this is one of our oldest
existing laws, going back at least to the General Laws of 1877,
and codified in the 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann. with very little change
or amendment, as will be discussed later.
Sections 21 to 25, Chapter 61, comprise the procedure for
condemning land of the United States or the State of Colorado.
The procedure therein set forth is quite different from the
DICTA
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other procedural portions of the general act (Sec. 1-20, Ch. 61)
or the Towns and Cities Act (Ch. 163), thereby adding to the
confusion. These sections are poorly drawn, without incorpora-
tion of definitions, leaving much to the judgment of the Court
without guidance. Fortunately, the act has been used so little
that the authors fail to find any reported case thereunder.
Sections 26-41, Chapter 61, were enacted by the legislature
in 1907, as a bill: Granting the exercise of the right of Eminent
Domain to Tunnel Transportation Companies, Pipe Line Trans-
mission Companies, Electric Power Transmission Companies and
Aerial Tramway Companies. The act itself merely confers upon
these companies the power of Eminent Domain, but does not pro-
vide for the procedure. In Sec. 7 " of the act is found the following
clauses:
... and when the parties cannot agree upon
the amount of compensation . . . same shall be deter-
mined in manner as now provided by law for the exercise
of the right of eminent domain. (Italics supplied.)
We ask, do the words as now provided by law mean the law of
1907 as it was without amendment, the law in 1908 at the time
of the next revision of the statutes of Colorado, the law in 1921
at the time of the compilation of Colorado law, or does it mean
the procedure under Sections 1-20, Chapter 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann.
as it exists now or may be changed hereafter?
The 1907 legislature, not quite satisfied with the confusion
it had added to our law, authorized certain telegraph, telephone,
electric light, power and pipe line companies to use the eminent
domain act.12 It gave such companies the right to acquire property
"as now provided by law for the exercise of the right of Eminent
Domain and in the manner as set forth in this act." Once again
the pertinent question is, "when is now?"
To add to the confusion, the legislature included provisions
in the second act of 1907 which were different from and contra-
dictory to the general act (Sections 1-20). It included a special
provision on immediate possession of property during pendency
of action 13 which is different both in procedure and substance
than the provision in the general act. 14
The question of the constitutionality of this special provision
has never been determined (although many cases have been tried
under it in the past 45 years), and both its application and in-
terpretation are still open to question. We mention one other inci-
dental problem with respect to it. Sec. 39, Chap. 82, 1935 Colo.
Stat. Ann., Housing, purports to confer upon a Housing Authority
the right to use this special provision for condemnation. Can such
right be given where the title of the original act limited its use
to telephone, power, telegraph and like companies?
"Now Sec. 32, Chap. 61, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN.
12 Now Sec. 42-49, Chap. 61, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN.
"Now Sec. 47, Chap. 61, 1935 CoLo. STAT. ANN.
4 Now Sec. 6, Chap. 61, 1935 CoLo. STAT. ANN.
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Secs. 50 and 61, Chap. 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., passed in
the 1901 session of the legislature, granted to telegraph, telephone,
heat, light, and power companies selling electrical energy, cer-
tain rights of eminent domain. The statute refers back to Sections
1-20 for its procedure.
But, Sec. 52, Chap. 61, supra, passed by the legislature in
the 1891 session already had granted certain rights of Eminent
Domain, including the right of companies to construct telegraph
lines and pipe lines.
Apparently there is some needless duplication, since even this
brief examination reveals that you may condemn rights-of-way
for telegraph lines under at least five different eminent domain
provisions. In fact, it is even possible that if a city were con-
demning land for a pipe line, the owner would be awarded a differ-
ent amount of compensation if the city chose to proceed under
one statute (Chap. 163) than if the city chose to proceed under
any of the other of its various authorities.
But that is not all, because if the city has a Home Rule
Charter, under Article XX of the Constitution, it may proceed
under the Eminent Domain provisions of the Charter and ignore
all the other laws granting the same power. Charter provisions
may vary to such an extent that we will not undertake to discuss
them here, except to mention that Denver's Charter adopts the
general law on the assessment of benefits and payment of dam-
ages and overrides other public uses (1927 Compilation, Section
80), with special provisions for boulevards, sewers, viaducts and
fire and police stations.
Having clearly demonstrated that confusion exists in the stat-
utory law of eminent domain, we would now like to analyze Secs.
1-20, Chap. 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., the procedural provisions
under which, as we have indicated, the bulk of all such condemna-
tion actions are brought.
Because this was a special procedural statute, it was not af-
fected by our new Rules of Civil Proceedure. As a result, an at-
torney who has the good fortune to represent a petitioner or a
respondent in such a case must learn a whole new set of rules
which hark back to the days of our Code with its not found I, re-
turns, etc.
This procedure is so old that if a married woman owns prop-
erty in her own right, her husband must be joined as a party with
her. 16 We trust that the League of Women Voters has not heard
of this.
A more patent defect in the procedure concerns the immediate
possession provision of the statute 17 under which, if proper con-
ditions are present, a condemning authority, after filing its peti-
tion, may obtain immediate possession of the premises being con-
demned during the pendency of the action. For many years this
"Sec. 4, Chap. 61, supra.
Sec. 2, Chap. 61, supra.
Sec. 6, Chap. 61, svpra.
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was considered an ex parte procedure. Then came the thunderbolt
of Swift z7. Smith 1 in which our Supreme Court said:
An order for immediate possession does not necessar-
ily involve title to the lands, but it does affect possession
so that the imperative requirement of the statute "shall
determine" would imply some notice to the one in actual
possesion with some opportunity afforded him to testify.
Just what do these words some notice mean? Do they mean a
telephone call; do they mean an actual personal service of a notice;
do they mean that every person in possession, including the minor
children, must be served; or do they mean that service on the
head of the family or a posting of the premises is sufficient? The
statute is so deficient in setting up the procedure for this immedi-
ate possession that it would require innumerable court cases to
delineate what could be simply explained by legislative act. If
the so-called procedural sections of the statute do not even set
forth the simplest formulae of procedure essential to due process
of law, we may as well be without them entirely.
Did you ever hear of a case in a court of record where the
defendant does not have to answer the complaint or petition? In
the condemnation procedure of our statute there is no provision
for answer. Thus, the case may come to trial without any indica-
tion as to the issues to be raised. In spite of the fact that no answer
is provided for, or necessary, 19 the act provides 20 that any party
may demand a jury of freeholders, "before the time for the de-
f-enant to appear and answer." This and man'y like Qfnnei ol
confusion pervade our present eminent domain law.
Another peculiarity of condemnation law is that at the trial
the respondent has the burden of proof, and opens and closes his
case to the jury.
During the past five years, the authors, acting either for the
petitioner or for the respondents, have participated in over 300
condemnation actions. This participation has revealed to us the
confusion which exists in our present acts and the desperate need
for revision.
We hope that this article has either revealed this confusion
to you or confused you sufficiently so that you, as members of the
Bar, will participate in an attempt to draft and have passed a
new Eminent Domain Act in Colorado which will clearly, con-
cisely state who may condemn property; for what purpose prop-
erty may be condemned; what property may be condemned and
under what circumstances; and, how condemnation shall proceed.
We submit it is time to rework and codify the law of eminent
domain from start to finish.
We note that in this issue of Dicta there are two suggestions
of possible procedural changes. One indicates the method used
by the Federal Government in adopting a special Rule of Civil
11 119 Colo. 126.
"Whitehead v. Denver, 13 Colo. App. 134, 136; 56 P. 913.
2 Sec. 7, Chap. 61, s&upra.
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Procedure dealing with the subject, and the other is an even more
simplified set of statutory or judicial rules suggested for Colorado.
We urge you to examine these and other changes which will be
suggested and lend your assistance in arriving at the best law,
both procedural and substantive, for the right to condemn private
property is a creature of statute, and such rights which deprive
people of their property without their consent for the good of the
public should be very clearly set forth.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE IN CONDEMNATION
OF PROPERTY
CLIFFORD C. CHITTIM
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Colorado.
The key to procedure in the Federal Courts in the condemna-
tion of property under the power of eminent domain is Rule 71A,1
which became effective as an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure August 1, 1951. This rule sets up a specialized
procedure to meet the distinctive requirements of an eminent do-
main action, and integrates into the Federal Rules the procedure in
such actions. Except as otherwise provided in that rule, the rules
of civil procedure for the United States District Courts control.
The adoption of Rule 71A came in response to growing wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the diverse procedures applied in con-
demnation suits in United States District Courts and the accom-
panying demand for some uniform procedure. The Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules, prior to its recommendation of the Rules of 1938,
and again when it was considering the amendments of 1946, had
given serious consideration to proposals to incorporate in the rules
one covering condemnation proceedings.2 The great number of con-
demnation suits filed by the United States during the war gave
added impetus to the demand for uniformity and some degree of
simplification in the rules. These procedural changes, it was ar-
gued, would make more effective both the exercise of the power of
eminent domain and the constitutional right of the property owner
to just compensation. Rule 71A brings condemnation proceedings
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; establishes, with one
exception, the same procedure in the various United States District
Courts; and, in an attempt to simplify the procedure, incorporates
several departures from the procedure more commonly followed in
the state courts and, prior to its adoption, in the federal courts.
The Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1938, were applicable
in condemnation cases only on appeals. In pre-appellate procedure,
a vast number of diversified procedures existed in the United States
District Courts. In some of the acts authorizing the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, Congress had prescribed, in varying
' United States Code, Title 28, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Ibid. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, following Rule 71A.
DICTA
